Chhattisgarh has become the epicentre of a military campaign to eliminate Maoists by March 2026. How is the conflict between government forces and the Maoists impacting local Adivasi communities?

The Adivasis of Bastar have been living under the shadow of the gun for close to two decades now. They have suffered much during this period. What we see today is a continuation and intensification of the armed conflict. Almost every aspect of the lives of the Adivasis residing in areas considered to be Maoist strongholds has been affected although they have been promised special constitutional safeguards.

Whether among security forces, Maoists, or civilians, the majority of those getting killed or maimed are Adivasis. They are the ones who get arrested on mere suspicion and languish in jails as undertrials or convicts. They are also the ones executed from time to time by Maoists as alleged police informers. From arrests, beatings and rapes to displacement from their villages, the Adivasis bear the brunt of this relentless war.

What is the state of Adivasi undertrials in jails?

Thousands of Adivasis in Bastar have been jailed under fabricated charges. Many languish as undertrials for years. Most get acquitted due to lack of evidence but the process itself is a severe punishment. In 2019, the Chhattisgarh government formed a committee led by Justice A.K. Patnaik to secure the release of innocent tribals—an admission of widespread false charges. However, it focussed only on cases with sentences of up to seven years, excluding most “naxali” cases.

Bastar’s overcrowded jails house around 4,000 inmates, mostly Adivasis—only a small fraction is of convicts. As a human rights lawyer, I have seen how naxalite cases unfold—false FIRs, baseless chargesheets, and painfully slow trials. After Maoist incidents, FIRs are often filed against “unknown” persons, allowing mass arrests on suspicion under draconian laws like the Chhattisgarh Special Public Security Act, 2005 and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention Act), 1967. These cases are tried in NIA [National Investigation Agency] courts. In most cases, police and security forces dominate as complainants, investigators and witnesses.

Meanwhile, families of undertrials suffer immensely—travelling long distances to courts and jails with little money, struggling to communicate with non-Gondi-speaking lawyers, and often being forced to sell their assets to cover legal expenses. Legal aid, though available, rarely reaches them.

A Gond woman stands in her burnt-down house in Pidiya village, Bijapur, in 2013. | Photo Credit: Bela Bhatia

How has the conflict affected Adivasi society?

Owing to years of conflict, Adivasi communities at the village level have got badly divided. The cohesion and community life that Adivasis had achieved over centuries, a marker of the traditional Adivasi way of life, are now much weakened in the conflict-torn areas of Bastar. They are forced to take sides and then targeted for the side they choose to support. The uniforms on both sides hold bodies, a large number of whom are of local Adivasis—insurgents and counter-insurgents.

The Maoist movement in Bastar is mostly an Adivasi movement, based on local recruits. In village after village, there are stories of people who have been killed or incarcerated as alleged Maoists or Maoist sympathisers. Likewise, in the towns, there are colonies of displaced Adivasis who were forced to vacate their homes and fields by the Maoists, or left of their own accord, for their safety.

“Bastar’s overcrowded jails house around 4,000 inmates, mostly Adivasis—only a small fraction is of convicts.”Bela Bhatia

In recent years, Adivasis of the Bastar region have staged protests against growing militarisation. What has been the government’s response?

The Bastar region has witnessed growing peaceful protests against the expansion of paramilitary camps, now numbering around 250, with more planned. Peaceful mass demonstrations have taken place at multiple sites, some lasting months or years. A key protest began in Sukma district’s Silger after a camp was established there without consent on May 12, 2021.

Between May 14 and 16, villagers protested peacefully, but the police responded with lathis, pepper spray and tear gas. On May 17, after lathicharge and stone-throwing by some protesters, the police opened fire, killing three (including a teenager) and injuring several others. Despite promises of an inquiry, no action followed, and another camp was covertly set up nearby. The protest fuelled broader resistance, leading to the formation of the Moolvasi Bachao Manch (MBM), a youth-led movement advocating peaceful change.

However, the state has come down on it, branding it as a Maoist front and using force—burning protest sites, evicting, carrying out lathicharges and making false cases—rather than engaging in dialogue. The MBM was banned in October 2024. Actions, not words, reveal the government’s stance on democratic rights.

Police camps in Bastar serve two purposes: suppressing the Maoist movement and facilitating mining operations. Only the first is officially acknowledged. Mining, a major threat to Adivasi communities, faces strong resistance, and camps help secure the area for it. While the government claims these camps aid road-building for development, the wide roads primarily benefit mining interests, not local people, who prefer small link roads.

Adivasis oppose both roads and camps due to land encroachment and environmental damage. Most camps and mines are set up without consent, often covertly at night, violating the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996, and the Forest Rights Act, 2006. Security camps, according to villagers, also bring harassment, brutality, theft, sexual exploitation, and arbitrary arrests. This leads to further Adivasi resistance.

Militarisation in Bastar is intensifying with new tactics, operations, and technology. Drones are now used for extensive surveillance, and reports suggest that they have facilitated aerial bombing or firing. This allegedly occurred in Sukma and Bijapur districts on January 11 and April 7, 2023, as well as on earlier occasions. While the security forces deny these claims, testimonies from affected communities suggest otherwise

A meeting of the Moolvasi Bachao Manch in 2023 in a village in Sukma district, Chhattisgarh. | Photo Credit: Bela Bhatia

How would you view the government’s Samadhan Prahar operation, which promises development-oriented steps for tribals, and military action against Maoists?

The government proudly claims that it has a three-pronged strategy to counter the Maoists: vishwas, vikas and suraksha (trust, development and security). However, it has failed on each front because its definition of each of these is its own and ignores the views of the largely Adivasi population of this region. The political representatives of the Adivasis in the State Assembly and the Parliament, who are Adivasis themselves, toe the party line, be it that of the BJP or the Congress. The roots of the conflict remain unaddressed.

Worse, the state continues to fan discontent amongst Adivasis by trampling upon their basic rights over local resources—jal, jungle, jameen and now khanij (water, forest, land, minerals)—in favour of corporate interests. People’s protests are quelled by brute force, or simply by ignoring their legitimate demands even when they are made through peaceful means.

“The first casualty of war is truth. In Bastar, too, dissenting voices have been relentlessly suppressed since the conflict began. ”Bela Bhatia

The current military offensive being deadline-driven, is there a scope left for a political resolution?

It’s a strange situation. Urban Chhattisgarh remains silent, unaffected by the conflict, while speaking up in Bastar invites real danger. Some who do speak irresponsibly urge the government to escalate militarisation, knowing Adivasis will bear the brunt. Maoists, too, push for an all-out fight.

Depending on which side you are on, you count or ignore the dead. There are numbers and statistics on both sides. Both prefer to forget the third side—the civilian Adivasis residing in the war zone, who may be caught in-between or sideways or whichever way. As far as the state is concerned, all those who reside in the war zone are Maoists, or at least suspected Maoists. As far as the Maoists and their supporters are concerned, any suggestion that civilians are caught in the crossfire amounts to contempt for the agency of the Adivasis and the inability to take sides—mainly the Maoist side.

Both sides claim that that they are waging the war “on behalf of the people” to “save” them. The war, like a conveyor belt, keeps rolling on year after year even as evidence on the ground indicates that it has been counterproductive. We know the political economies of war—there are always those who profit, growing fat and cynical on blood money, ensuring that the conflict never ends.

Adivasi communities of Bastar have been living with barbed wire-curtains for decades. | Photo Credit: Bela Bhatia

In recent years, many activists working in the tribal rights sector have alleged state repression. What has been your experience?

The first casualty of war is truth. In Bastar, too, dissenting voices have been relentlessly suppressed since the conflict began. During Salwa Judum and Operation Green Hunt, fear prevailed, making it nearly impossible for outsiders to access interior villages or even smaller towns. Those journalists who spoke out were targeted by the police and the Salwa Judum. This pattern of quelling dissent continued later on, and extended not only to journalists and social workers but also to lawyers and researchers.

I personally experienced this repression starting in October 2015 when my landlord in Jagdalpur abruptly asked me to leave (he was a tailor making police and CRPF uniforms). I moved to Parpa village, near Jagdalpur, but in March 2016, a hostile rally was staged outside my house, pressuring my Adivasi landlady to evict me. A leaflet labelled me as a “naxali dalal” (naxal agent), and harassment continued, the most dramatic being the simultaneous effigy burning of social activists (including me) by the police in several locations in Bastar.

Other intimidation tactics followed, such as anonymous threats or phone-snatching at an anti-Maoist rally. In January 2017, there was a police-backed vigilante attack on my home in Parpa. This occurred hours after I assisted an NHRC [National Human Rights Commission] team investigating rape and sexual assault cases by security forces in Bijapur. In September 2019, I learnt I was under intense surveillance—my phone had been hacked using Pegasus spyware, almost certainly by the Indian government.

A house burnt by security forces in Pidiya village, Bijapur, in 2013. | Photo Credit: Bela Bhatia

What happens to the probes ordered into allegations of alleged fake encounters and killings?

Periodic incidents of human rights violations have continued unabated even after Salwa Judum was banned in 2011, including fake encounters, sexual violence, fabricated cases and routine harassment.

Even when the scale of state-committed crimes was colossal, the wheels of justice remained rusted and skewed. Two examples are the massacres that occurred in Sarkeguda and Edesmetta (Bijapur district) in the intervening nights of 28-29 June, 2012, and 17-18 May, 2013, respectively. In Sarkeguda, 17 civilians including six minors were gunned down by the CRPF [Central Reserve Police Force] personnel when security forces on a night operation mistook a peaceful assembly for Maoists. In Edesmetta, eight civilians including four minors were killed when CRPF personnel opened fire on a peaceful gathering celebrating Beeja Pandum, a local seed-festival prior to the beginning of the agricultural cycle.

In both cases, a judicial commission was formed to probe the incident. In the Sarkeguda incident, the commission submitted its report to the Chhattisgarh government in late 2019. In the Edesmetta incident, the report was submitted in September 2021 and tabled in the State Assembly in March 2022. These two massacres are noteworthy not only for their heavy toll but also for the fact that both were thoroughly probed by a judicial commission, unlike many other incidents of this sort. The commission reports clearly hold the security forces responsible. In spite of this, no action has been taken against anyone for these massacres.

What immediate steps should be taken to de-escalate the situation?

Actions of both sides have contributed to pushing the Adivasi society backward rather than forward. A public call for a ceasefire is essential. In the interest of the people of Bastar, both parties must strive for a political resolution. Ordinary citizens should no longer remain silent spectators to a war that has lost all meaning and in which there will be no winners. The war in Bastar must end. Enough lives have already been lost.