Goalkeepers are no longer just shot-stoppers.

There was a time when the goalkeeper’s only responsibility was to keep the ball out of their net, kick it long and, if you go back far enough, pick up backpasses directly from defenders.

The goalkeeper’s role, however, has evolved over the last decade — arguably, more than any position.

Goalkeepers now must be proactive in the way they contribute in possession (ball-playing in build-up) and out of possession (cross-claiming, sweeping).

This trend in football is leaving David de Gea behind, with the goalkeeper and Manchester United suffering as a result.

Shot-stopping

Goalkeepers’ responsibilities may have expanded, but the importance of shot-stopping remains the same. The graphic below shows how De Gea has faced a high volume of high-quality shots per 90 minutes and is preventing them at an above-average rate.

United approach defending as individuals, rather than a team. This means their defence is often exposed, particularly during transitions. Any goalkeeper would have struggled given the way United set themselves up last season.

The graphic below illustrates the trends of De Gea’s shot-stopping for Manchester United since 2017-18, looking at the difference between the expected goals on target faced and the goals he conceded.

Expected goals on target (or xGOT) measures the likelihood of an on-target shot resulting in a goal based on a combination of the underlying chance quality (xG) and the end location of the shot within the goalmouth. It serves as a good indicator of a goalkeeper’s performance in shot-stopping.

As we can see, De Gea reached a career-high in terms of shot-stopping in the 2021-22 Premier League season, vastly over-performing given the quality of shots he faced. But even that didn’t last.

De Gea’s best attribute, you can argue, is shot-stopping. He isn’t comfortable with the ball at his feet and rarely comes off his line, which also means he faces shots at a higher rate to compensate.

That is not possible to sustain over an entire season so it is hardly surprising his performances began to plummet — his numbers last season went from the best in the league to the worst. His stints of exceptional shot-stopping eventually balance out with individual mistakes.

Cross engagement

It is one thing to stop shots, but another thing to handle the ball well. The graphic below illustrates the percentage of crosses Premier League goalkeepers engage with (through claiming, punching and clearing) against their success rate. De Gea ranks the lowest for cross engagement.

He rarely comes off his line and tends to punch crosses away rather than catch them, leaving United vulnerable.

Having a goalkeeper who engages with crosses would bring so many benefits, making the team stronger when defending corners and in open play, particularly when their defenders have been pulled out of position. If De Gea was safely taking possession of crosses as frequently as, say, Alisson, he could also provide a springboard to make United more effective on the counter-attack.

But with De Gea, United leave all this potential untapped.

Ball-playing

Goalkeepers are now the most frequent (and, arguably, most important) starting point of a team’s build-up. Not only must they be able to find the free man with a direct ball in behind the opposition, but they must also release passes under the pressure of a high press.

A goalkeeper involved in the build-up helps a team cope with opposition forwards constantly closing down the centre-halves, or a mid-block that has shut out the central midfielders.

In the Premier League, having a goalkeeper who is competent on the ball helps provide numerical superiority. But with De Gea, Manchester United are always one man down in possession. The defenders do not have an outlet on the ball, so the team struggle more than they should when playing through a press. This, of course, isn’t entirely the goalkeeper’s fault — Manchester United’s midfielders bear the greatest responsibility — but it exacerbates the problem.

We can look at the example of Manchester United’s 2-1 loss against Brighton at home on the Premier League’s opening weekend.

Manchester United struggled against Brighton’s press. To escape it, they either had to play through the press, over it or around it. Playing through it, given their dysfunctional “McFred” midfield, presented its own difficulties and playing over the press wasn’t an option, given De Gea’s distribution limitations over longer distances.

This is reflected in the graphic below. When De Gea got the ball, the best he could do was quickly lay it off wide to another centre-half, making it much harder for United to play their way out of trouble.

We can compare this to his opposite number. Robert Sanchez’s long distribution gave Brighton an outlet in possession — he could find their runners (normally, Danny Welbeck) in space and immediately transition from defence to attack.

This can be seen as early as eight minutes into the game at Old Trafford.

The second line of Brighton’s pressure (Leandro Trossard and Welbeck) is positioned to pounce on short passing options (red arrows). A goalkeeper more comfortable on the ball could help United evade this trap by playing it long.

However, De Gea’s poor accuracy in long-range passing inevitably means the opposition would regain possession. There are many options — but with De Gea, United are limited.

So the only feasible (short) pass he can make here is to Fred. And that he does.

De Gea plays into the trap and Fred has to release the ball quickly, given the pressure from Adam Lallana. Trossard anticipates the pass to Diogo Dalot (out of shot) and intercepts in the box. De Gea’s lack of comfort playing the ball, especially under pressure, is a problem.

The same happens in Manchester United’s 4-0 away loss to Brentford — and this time his mistake is punished.

De Gea receives the ball from Lisandro Martinez after a free kick. The Spain goalkeeper has multiple options on the ball. He could pass it to either centre-half, who would have an easy pass out to a full-back; he could play it to the full-backs, who are, helpfully, in wide positions; or he could pass it through the middle — the most dangerous option, given Christian Eriksen has a marker breathing down his neck.

De Gea takes an extra touch, inviting pressure from Brentford’s forwards. He sees Mathias Jensen tight on Eriksen’s blind side…

…but passes regardless of the impending danger. This leads to Jensen easily stealing the ball away…

…and creating an opening to shoot and score.

To play out from the back successfully, a player needs more than technical ability. He also needs good judgement to know which pass is optimal. De Gea struggles with the clipped ball over the first line of pressure, which means in situations like the above, he immediately starts at a disadvantage.

It gives the opposition an easy way to force turnovers — invite the short ball, wait for him to play it, pounce and win it back in a vulnerable part of the field.

United’s two successive losses this season show the players didn’t follow the plan at key moments and were punished.

This is not restricted to one or two games, either. The graphic below illustrates the most frequent type of passes that United make from sequences beginning in their own third. It shows us how they typically move the ball when making the first, second and third pass.

Given that these are the very early passes of a possession sequence, De Gea’s lack of involvement underlines how little he offers on the ball.

To say Manchester United’s problems start and end with De Gea is misguided.

But as long as United insist on playing him, his liability on the ball and resistance towards stepping off his line will cost them.

United have conceded six goals in two games, and De Gea was at least partially culpable for four of those due to his lack of proactivity. In both games, he was outperformed by his Spanish counterparts.

The game has moved on and De Gea has not. Manchester United need to get with the times.